Real Special Douglas Feith and the Office of Special Plans |
by Justin Raimondo |
As Iraq slides into the abyss [.pdf], and the domestic reverberations of the conflict shake American politics, the question of who lied us into war is being raised – and not just by Democrats. There is a growing suspicion that we didn't just get the intelligence wrong – and a growing clamor to retrace our steps back to the source of what seems like deliberate deception. The inspector general at the Department of Defense has issued a report [.pdf] criticizing the intelligence disseminated to senior policymakers in the run-up to war: "The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaeda relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers. While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate given that the intelligence assessments were intelligence products and did not clearly show the various with the consensus of the Intelligence Community. This condition occurred because of an expanded role and mission of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from policy formulation to alternative intelligence analysis and dissemination. As a result, the Office of the Undersecretary for Defense Policy did not provide 'the most accurate analysis of intelligence' to senior decision-makers." |
Monday, February 12, 2007
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